

Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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TWO YEARS AFTER THE FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE

Dorde JERKOVIČ

BY the end of January Chou En Lai expressed the wish of his Government at the outstanding problems relating to the Far Eastern area be reviewed by means of new international talks, while laying particular stress on this occasion on the need to renew talks on the Viet Name problem. These events are developing contrary to the agreement reached in Geneva in 1954 between China, France, Great Britain, the USSR, the USA and the representatives of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. There was no response so far by the other countries to this Chinese overture, just as the suggestions of India, the declaration of India and the Soviet Union published during the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to that country on the same problem and in the same sense, remained unheeded. As for the USSR which showed unequivocally already during the conference itself that it was not in the least enthusiastic as regards its invocation and still less as regards its conclusions, no reply was given to the suggestions made and initiatives taken so far. No answer was received on the British side either although, together with the Soviet Union, Britain whose representatives presided over the conference is most competent to judge whether and how the Geneva decisions are being implemented and, if such not the case, what should be done towards Viet Nam.

In the meantime developments in Indo-China or, to be more precise, in Viet Nam have taken an entirely contrary course to that foreseen in Geneva which does not in the least warrant the complete lack of interest of the countries which participated in the enactment of the Agreement and its decisions. As known, it was decided in Geneva in 1954 to cease hostilities and reach an armistice between the two opposing camps in Viet Nam and in Indo-China provided the Northern part of the country remains under the control of Ho Chi Minh, while the Southern part would remain under the control of the Southern authorities and France. It was further resolved that a plebiscite be carried out before July 1956 with the aim of unifying the country, and that the authorities of Northern and Southern Viet Nam should initiate talks for the purpose of working out the details and procedure for this final act. The conference also decided, with a view to ensuring the enforcement of the provisions of the Geneva Agreement, that an international neutral Commission be set up consisting of representatives of Poland, Canada and India, under the presidency of India.

At present, twenty two months after this important Conference and only four months before the implementation of its final provision, one may well ask: what of these decisions, what of Viet Nam? Merely by fol-

lowing daily press reports and the statements of the neutral control Commission representatives, the average observer may well conclude that no headway whatever was made as regards the implementation of the Geneva decisions and moreover that things had taken a contrary course and that the cause of Viet Name union is at best still at the same point as on the eve of the Geneva conference, although armed conflict ceased, and there is no reason to believe it might be renewed in the foreseeable future.

In the first place the Southern Government ousted Emperor Bao Dai and introduced a special regime in the country by formally proclaiming full independence after overthrowing the feudal emperor and French control. In this case, however, the French policy adhered to the provisions of the Geneva Agreement which coincided with its interests in that area; consequently the liquidation of the French positions was contrary to the Geneva policy since the Southern authorities enjoyed the full support of the American policy, on which they relied for support from the very beginning. Namely on that side the Geneva Agreement was always contemplated as an act of appeasement towards "Sino-communist expansion" before which America does not wish to retreat, least of all in so important an area as Indo-China which represents an invaluable base on Asian soil. On such a basis the Southern Government carried out elections on its behalf and definitely repudiated the policy of unification of the country foreseen by the Geneva agreement while biding the time when this could be carried out by other means, thus enabling it to extend its control to the Northern part of the country.

Certain symptoms were noted of late, however, indicating that the policy of Southern Viet Nam has met with British support or at least its tacit approval. This conclusion was also vouchsafed by the recent Washington conference, at which, according to the communiqué, this delicate problem was not discussed, notwithstanding the undeniable British responsibility for the fate of the Geneva decisions and for developments in Viet Nam. It is considered that a certain modification of British policy took place in Washington so as to adjust it more to the course of her partner, which would warrant the hypothesis that the same was done concerning the policy in Viet Nam.

Judging by the general course adopted by the new French government whose initial steps would indicate a stronger tendency to independent action than was formerly the case, greater insistence on the Geneva decisions may reasonably be expected all the more so as the latter coincides with the national interests of France in general, par-

ticularly in Indo-China, where she met with an extremely reasonable attitude in the North so far. In view of the foregoing, and of the manifest interest of China and India as well as of the Soviet Union it may reasonably be concluded that matters are not yet beyond remedy, particularly if the initiatives and suggestions made so far do not remain unheeded and are followed by other still more determined and persistent steps which would not necessarily have to be confined within the limits laid down in Geneva.

If necessary the United Nations Organization could be invited to assume responsibility for the fulfillment of such solemn international agreements, nor would this be in any way unusual or inadequate.

At any rate, the problem is ripe for solution, and however contrary the present developments may be to the Geneva decisions, the growing interest of the Asian independent policy, and the eventual interest of France and other countries show that perhaps all is not lost yet. Perhaps in this case it is just a matter of constance and perseverance in an effort which is expected by the world, vitally interested in the settlement of this and similar important problems for peace and pacification.

THE FIRST RETREAT

IT cannot be denied that in its inaugural declaration in Parliament the new French Government formulated its intentions and programme in a realistic, moderate and promising manner. This is far from implying that the programme laid down may be assessed as perfect from every point of view. In accordance with its position in the Parliament with which it must collaborate, the Government worked out a programme which is inevitably a compromise under the present conditions. It is no less a fact, however, that taken as a whole the elements which prevail in the Government programme make it a promising and encouraging document contemplated from the standpoint of a progressive national policy and from a broader European standpoint.

As stressed publicly on several occasions, such a conception is all the more significant in view of the approach to international problems adopted by the new French government, particularly those which divide East and West, and to the all important problem of disarmament. As known, the Government stressed, among its other intentions, its desire to give priority in the settlement of outstanding international issues, to the endeavours aiming at the negotiation of an

agreement on disarmament, which was not the practice so far in Eastern or Western policy. As many other countries, among which Yugoslavia occupies a prominent position, France also seems to have reached the conclusion, under the present Republican Front Government, that the ways adopted so far in the quest of international agreements likely to lead to pacification were not adequate nor the approaches realistic, primarily because the controversial issues were not dealt with in their logical order of priority. The placing of the disarmament problem in the forefront should therefore imply a tendency towards the adoption of a different order, and also that at the present juncture, international relations, particularly the relations between East and West, have not reached a point where they should "freeze up" and come to a stalemate, thus giving free rein to the increasingly alarming armaments race. On the contrary, as shown by the new French Government in its reactions to a series of recent developments, including the Bulganin—Eisenhower correspondence, the quest for the most suitable approach should be continued by concerted effort of East and West alike towards the achievements of agreements and solutions, provided that, after the previous adverse experiences, the first step be made to negotiate an agreement on a general and proportionate disarmament which would be carried out under international control.

Things have been developing favourably thus far. It was obvious, however, from the very advent of the Republican Front Government that it will not be able to bypass the colonial problem by which it is confronted in a highly acute form in Algeria, and which is, in a certain sense, the precondition for any efficacious action of the country in the international, particularly the European, arena where France and Europe are faced by tasks and problems of paramount importance for the future.

Two fundamental theses, or two schools of thought prevail in contemporary French policy as to the conditions and ways of restoring the national policy of the country. According to one school of thought, a strong and respected France can only be built under the present conditions by means of an all-out and concerted endeavour to consolidate its positions in the colonial empire, i. e. strengthen its empire on the conventional (classic) colonialist foundations. In other words a strong colonial empire would constitute the basis of a powerful metropolis and infuse its international policy and prestige with new vigour. According to the second conception the rehabilitation of the country and its policy would be based on such a policy in the former colonies as would enable the creation of a powerful and respected community of peoples on a modern democratic basis or, in other words, precisely on the abolishment of the relations based and developed on the conception of a colonial "empire" whose withering away has already had so adverse an effect on the state and development of the metropolis.

The policy based on the first thesis led to war and defeat in Indo-China, wars and withdrawal in Tunisia and Morocco and, for the time being, to a "little" war in Algeria, which threatens to oust France for good from these areas, but not without a protracted struggle similar to those which have already substantially drained the country's resources and which are largely responsible for the impotence and immobility that have almost become the dominant features of contemporary France. When and in

so far as the country was guided according to the second thesis, she at least succeeded in saving something in Indo-China, a little more in Tunisia and Morocco and even in preserving reasonable interests in Algeria. Only at such moments did France prove capable of devoting part of the energy and attention she gave to European and international problems to her own benefit and that of the broader international community.

Seen in this light it is obvious that the first course is wrong and detrimental while the other is evidently the right one, as the sole path which offers some prospects for the future. Moreover, the new Government has a rare opportunity and chance and it depends only whether it will be able to muster sufficient courage, strength and boldness to adopt this course of action which it only intimidated somewhat vaguely in public statements. Because if the present opportunity is missed, and if in the present phase of the Franco-Algerian dispute the new Government is incapable of coping with the task, it seems that the last real big chance will have slipped by.

The intentions enunciated were encouraging and Premier Mollet's trip to Algiers was made to show the importance and urgency attributed by his Government to the problem of Algeria. However the sacrifice of General Catroux to the rightists in Paris and the selfish interest of the overseas colonialists already in the very beginning bides no good, and does not indicate the determination of the Government to persist in its efforts to reach an indispensable democratic settlement of the Algerian problem. This retreat and the attitude maintained so far indicate the danger lest the government be entangled in a situation from which it could only emerge by resigning or withdrawing, which does not seem desirable, while the world at large would consider this rather as indicating the incompetence of the Government and its policy than as a logical result of the balance of power, which notwithstanding all breaches, is not such as to require retreats and concessions.

RESPONSIBILITY AND INDECISION

AS known, the Near East occupied an important place in the recent Washington talks between Premier Eden and President Eisenhower, as the policies of the two countries with regard to this part of the world are considerably at variance: Britain insists on the formula of the Bagdad pact and expects the United States to join her, while the latter refused to comply having duly realized the unrealistic character of such a policy in view of the widespread opposition of the Arab countries. France remained aloof from the Near Eastern policy while regarding the Bagdad formula with disfavour, among other reasons because the latter presupposed the elimination of French influence in this area, thus investing the French attitude towards the Bagdad pact at a crucial moment with a specific imprint.

From the British point of view, the purpose of the Washington talks consisted in enlisting the full support of the American policy for the British conception, or at least after the transformation of the Pact into a

politico-economic body, in ensuring a great financial support from the United States which would implement their economic schemes in the Near East through this organization. It is considered, and such conclusions are warranted by certain concrete indications that the talks have not succeeded in eliminating or reducing the existing differences of views and therefore failed in bringing about an agreement on this subject.

However, the conference led to the conclusion of another agreement on Western action in case of threat to Near Eastern security owing to the Arab-Israeli dispute and the influence of other factors. Agreement was reached in Washington that in view of the complex relations in this area, and in view of possible unexpected developments in these relations, Western policy was pledged, should the need arise, to the implementation and preservation of the peace on the basis of the status quo, in accordance with the well-known Tripartite Declaration made by France, Great Britain and America in 1950, by which the three powers guarantee peace and the permanence of the present frontiers in this area. This implies the French participation in the common policy for this region was sought in Washington and that this fundamental policy should evolve along the lines charted in the 1950 Declaration which will have teeth put in it if deemed necessary and expedient.

It is still a question, however, who is competent, and in what manner to determine whether the situation in the Near East is such as to require broader action in the sense of the 1950 Declaration, or, in other words, whether the three Western countries will assess the situation and act directly and independently, or whether they will do so through the United Nations Organisation which assumed full responsibility for the solution of the Near Eastern problem, particularly the Arab-Israeli dispute, and therefore exclusively competent and responsible for the fate of peace and security in this part of the world. This is the essence of the entire problem, and it is here that misunderstandings are most likely to occur, the consequences of which may be far more serious than those of an eventual Arab-Israeli conflict. It should primarily be noted in this context that many things have changed since 1950 to date, primarily both in the Near Eastern area and on the broad international scene, hence in the international attitude towards the problems and relations in the Near East. Therefore the decision to apply 1950 standards and criteria to the present situation and seek such solutions by means of formulas which are perhaps obsolete and superannuated does not seem particularly expedient.

The general world situation in 1950 when the cold war reached its climax might have vouchsafed the views expressed in the Tripartite Declaration on the Near East. The world was split in two camps at the time. Consequently, from the standpoint of general security, the Near East could have been contemplated as part of the Western sphere and the problem of peace and security in this region as an integral part of the broad problem of world peace and security which were uncertain at that time. Under such a condition Western intervention in the spirit of the 1950 Declaration, whatever the objections the latter called forth from various quarters, could be regarded as a necessary measure and, under given conditions, as realistic and beneficial.

Since then, however, things have changed in the world at large as the problem.

immediate security has receded into the background; nor can the Near East be contemplated as an area for whose fate the big powers are directly responsible. After Bandung, the Afro-Asian policy in which the Arab world occupies a prominent position has more resolutely embarked on the pursuit of a policy aiming at the consolidation of its own positions and world peace, while the United Nations Organisation is in a position to discharge its responsibilities more efficiently than was previously the case. Last, a considerably altered Eastern policy appeared as a new factor on the broader international scene, so that its influence is being felt more strongly in the Near East, and is reflected in the attitudes and courses of action open to the Arab people as regards the implementation of a more independent policy. Briefly things have changed and developed to such an extent that the problem of Near Eastern security primarily arises within the intricate pattern of the general tasks and responsibilities of the United Nations and the world at large, but through and within the United Nations, and second as a problem of the peoples directly concerned who entrusted the issue to the United Nations. Under such conditions it could not be said that the Tripartite Declaration represents a realistic or up to date basis on which a constructive Near Eastern policy could be shaped.

Under the present conditions, in case of an infringement of or direct threat to peace, particularly in the Near Eastern area, an action by the signatories of the Tripartite Declaration and from the positions of the latter would be at cross purposes with the UN objectives and responsibilities and would most probably result in far more serious and broader complications. If, however, such an action proceeded through the United Nations and on behalf of the United Nations, it would automatically be dissociated from the Declaration as it would transcend its framework and the intentions of its authors. The three signatory powers of the Tripartite Declaration have probably also realised this, but if so, it is no less incomprehensible why they seek to revive it today and why they hold talks on the basis of the latter, in order to chart a course of joint action in case developments in the Near East take a turn for the worse, when the latter could at any rate be far more efficiently checked by UN action and the cooperation of all countries within this Organisation which is both the safest and the most competent for constructive action.

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

COMPARATIVELY little is known and heard in the world about the Union of South Africa. Not only geographically distant and surrounded by oceans and the vast African colonial regions, this remote country also seems politically isolated in the world of today. Its participation in the United Nations is negligible and limited to two issues, namely when it is accused of racial discrimination in general, and discrimination towards the Hindus on its territory in particular, its protest and subsequent boycott of all further debates. Owing to its policy of race discrimination the Union of South Africa was not invited to Bandung while its geographical position enabled it to remain aloof so far from the other international and bloc organizations. As a member of the Commonwealth, the Union of South Africa failed to distinguish itself by any particular initiative and activity, so that its present position is extremely reminiscent of the British attitude at the time of „splendid isolation”.

However, this state reappeared in press headlines of late first in connection with its rupture of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, thus following the example set by Australia two years ago and that of Iraq last year. Meanwhile other press reports appeared concerning the decision of the Government of the Union of South Africa to approach a gradual revision of its discriminatory policy towards the coloured population with a view to enlisting these citizens more actively in the life of the country, and particularly for the purpose of bringing about a rapprochement with the neighbouring countries which are inhabited exclusively by coloured negro population.

The champions of Bandung on Afro-Asian soil consider that in the years to come the decisive struggle will be waged in Africa between the colonialist and anti-colonialist policy. In their opinion and according to the objective state of affairs, an anti-colonial revolution changed the face of Asia and is currently taking place in Africa where it has entered upon its concluding stage: North Africa is already on the threshold of emancipation, while the Arab world has already transcended this phase. South of them lies the vast Sahara Desert, still further south the numerous peoples under trusteeship of the colonial administration of Belgium, Great Britain, and France, and to the extreme south the Union of South Africa. If Africa south of the Sahara is the next battlefield from the standpoint of the anti-colonialist revolution, then it is logically also the last major strongpoint and position from which final resistance will be offered by the colonialist forces.

On the other hand, contemplated in the light of East-West relations which assumed forms of economic and financial competition and rivalry in the undeveloped regions on Afro-Asian territory, the latter being still devoid of such national and political forces as those already created in Asia, Africa is inevitably invested with a particular and specific role and importance. It would also be possible to reject the economic struggle in that area, to adopt a reserved attitude and remain aloof from the major events the repercussions of which have so far proved most favourable for

those countries and parts of the Afro-Asian world which knew to use them for the strengthening and consolidation of their own independent positions. These events and the clash of these contrasting tendencies in the world of today gave rise to the idea of the need to erect an adequate barrier in Africa which would check both the penetration of the Bandung influence and the infiltration of Eastern policy in the form of economic, financial and other action. Lastly, from the standpoint of an eventual armed conflict between East and West, Africa and particularly that part south of the Sahara can assume particular significance within the framework of a global strategy in view of its position, bases, raw materials, resources, etc. Contemplated from this standpoint the efforts to bring about a situation on that part of the continent which would render it capable of fulfilling such a function is all the more understandable.

It seems that the ideas deriving from such a conception have led so far to the conclusion that it is necessary to hold a conference of all countries concerned with the problems of South African defence. Hence the combinations involving the introduction of autonomy in some parts of this region, the granting of a greater or smaller degree of independence, with incorporation into the Commonwealth etc., are more or less directly connected with the idea of the conference and its aims. It is in this light that the rupture of relations between the Union of South Africa and the USSR should be contemplated as well as the impending revision of the racial policy of this country which should constitute the mainstay of any combination set up south of the Sahara. The revision of racial policy in the Union of South Africa is intended to restore the confidence lost in the coloured world, and perhaps also ensure the indispensable internal stability, thus enabling the Union to appear before its partners and neighbours as an ally worthy of confidence.

So far the revision of racial policy has only been limited to public statements, and it would seem that the initial steps will consist in the abolishment of certain forms of economic discrimination. Nevertheless it is a big question whether the Union will be able to make any major progress in this direction as its very foundations are built on discrimination, and even the gradual liquidation of the coloured population. It is no less a question whether time and the curse of events will enable the establishment of the anti-Bandung strongpoint envisioned in this country and that part of the world, i. e. the barrier against the inexorable advance of anti-colonialism, which is steadily expanding and developing in the vast regions of Africa. This will all be tangibly demonstrated in due time. So far one can only speak of plans which are perhaps already elaborated in the minds of the statesmen concerned, but which it will be far more difficult to implement in practice under conditions marked by an ever growing tendency to emancipation in contemporary Africa.



THE REASON FOR SCHOOL REFORM

J. LUKATELA

NEW Yugoslavia inherited an under-developed system of education. The large number of illiterates which averaged 45.2%, and in some backward areas even 72% best shows the situation of compulsory education. Although there existed a law on compulsory schooling, the poorly developed network of schools and the inadequate number of teachers did not permit its implementation. At the same time a large number of teachers, professors and lecturers awaited employment for years.

The social and economic development of the country after the Liberation which oriented itself towards the development of a modern national industry and the advancement of agricultural production called for the training of medium and highly skilled specialists in addition to raising the general educational level among the broad masses of people. In order to realize this, steps were taken directly after the war for the enactment of a law on compulsory seven-year education which was later extended to eight years, and this project is now being gradually put into effect. Attention was also devoted to the extension of the secondary school network and the creation of various types of lower vocational schools.

In the period from 1938/39 to 1953/54, the number of elementary schools rose from 8,956 to 14,044, secondary schools from 439 to 2,106, lower vocational schools from 90 to 261, and the number of higher schools and faculties from 29 to 84. The number of students especially increased in the secondary schools and universities. In the secondary schools for general education the number of students rose from 69,872 to 103,994, in the lower vocational schools from 14,947 to 56,593 and in the universities and faculties from 17,734 to 57,937. This large increase which was particularly rapid in the first post-war years raised a series of problems which, awaiting solution, were of a material nature involving the problem of cadres such as the lack of school space premises as well as of teachers.

The development of our social community on socialist organizational principles imposes much more complex demands on the citizens than was the case in the old society. The new society is being built on the principles of social self-government, on workers' management in factories, on the participation of citizens in directing various activities in all spheres of life. As a result an increasing number of citizens are daily joining various organs of social management in education, health services, social services, workers' councils etc. In addition, many citizens are taking part every day in discussions at voters' meetings, at the meetings of the Socialist Alliance etc. For a successful participation in all these forms of work the need arises not only for a wider and more comprehensive acquaintance with a number of facts but also for being able to take decisions. If we wish to train new generations to live up to the tasks which await them, we must not leave their education to chance, but should adapt the whole educational process to that demand.

Schools in our country today, although they underwent certain changes during the last ten years, especially in introducing new subject-matters and new methods, have not yet been able to free themselves from traditional conceptions of education.

Noticing the disharmony between education and our contemporary society, and realizing that there is hardly any prospect of bringing more rapidly the present day schools in line with the needs of the society, the Federal National Assembly appointed a commission with the tasks of examining the possibilities for the reform of education and submitting a proposal for the settlement of this problem. In addition to people's deputies of the Federal Assembly, the commission also includes a corresponding number of experts. In examining this problem, the commission primarily had in mind the above mentioned reasons and from this viewpoint made an analysis of the system which was in operation, together with its organization, content and methods of work in individual

types of schools. In order to ensure a successful activity, the Federal Commission formed a series of subcommissions for individual spheres of education. Steps were taken for the formation of subcommissions for the institutions of pre-school education, for compulsory schools, for secondary schools, for vocational schools for adult education, for the material base of education, as well as subcommissions for the training of the teaching cadres.

The problems which were to be dealt with by the subcommission for compulsory education were certainly the most important and most voluminous as they involve principles which apply to the whole system of education. For this reason the main activity was directed, in the first phase, towards the solution of precisely these questions. The proposal of the subcommission was adopted by the Commission which established the basic principles of compulsory education, invited the educational workers, professional associations and the public at large to take part in a wide discussion. After this discussion, having examined various opinions and proposals, the Federal Commission will submit the final proposal to the Federal National Assembly for consideration and final decision. The adoption of this proposal by the Assembly would lay the foundations of our new school system.

What are the basic principles established by the Federal Commission?

The Commission primarily established that the above mentioned reasons call for a fundamental change of the whole school system at present in operation, i. e. its structure, relations and methods of work, and that the following is required for the realization of this reform:

compulsory education must be conducted through a uniform type of eight-year school for general education where specialization would not figure but where stress would be laid on the development of pupils' inclinations also taking into consideration the needs of the area in question;

schooling in the traditional framework as conducted so far should be imbued with elements of general technical education constituting with it a unified whole (the new conception of general education will contribute to a better understanding of the technical development of modern society and of the development of the working abilities of students);

efforts must be made to develop a scientific view of the world through social and natural sciences and help understanding of social and natural manifestations, their laws and interdependence;

the whole educational activity must be based on the development of the active participation of students in the process of education; work in schools must be closely linked with work outside the school and this should be considered a single process; in selecting and elaborating material the psychological and physical capabilities of the pupil should be borne in mind;

the comprehensive educational activity in the school should be directed towards forming an active citizen imbued with the spirit of brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav peoples, the spirit of respect for other nations, with love of work and respect for the human rights and freedoms.

In order to achieve these goals, it would be necessary to adapt the whole work to the methods and other relations which make their appearance in the educational process, and gradually find the best solution for the system of examinations and estimation of students' capabilities. These bases will be used for further activity in considering plans and programmes for the compulsory eight-year school.

Questions concerning other spheres of education and schooling in a wider sense are under consideration in individual subcommissions and will be gradually placed on the agenda of the Federal Commission.

ATOMIC ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Dr. J. ARNEJC

ATOMIC energy is becoming an ever more important factor in international relations. It is given serious attention at almost all international conferences and talks at present. Various consultative bodies for international cooperation in peacetime uses of atomic energy have already been or are being created, and new international bodies are being planned which will approach the realization of organized cooperation of States in this field. The Scandinavian Council has formed an Atomic Energy Commission, and representatives of the countries which submitted a new draft statute of the proposed international atomic energy agency are to meet in New York to study the recommendations and proposals of other countries which are interested in such an agency. In the United Nations, too, the Consultative Committee of the Secretary General will discuss the statute of the future United Nations International Agency for Atomic Energy. Lately there have been many debates on EVRATOM — the proposed atomic pool of the six countries of the so-called Little Europe. Cooperation of European countries in peacetime uses of atomic energy will also be discussed by the member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on the basis of a report prepared by the OEEC's Commission for Atomic Energy. There are reports that the East European countries will consider the realization of a collective plan for the development of atomic energy in their area. If we add to these multilateral activities also the bilateral agreements which have been or are being concluded by individual countries, we shall immediately grasp how great is the importance attached to atomic energy in international relations. It seems that the atomic energy expert who said that the diplomats have taken over the matters of atomic energy was not far from the truth.

Although there are considerable activities in this field, we have not heard after Geneva that atomic energy began to be used in any new field. With the exception of the use of isotopes — which are in fact by-products of atomic energy — in industry, medicine and so on, atomic energy has so far been mostly used for the production of electric power. Only lately have we heard about intentions to use it as fuel in transport — maritime transport in particular. News about experiments in this field has come from both the Soviet Union and from America. It seems that all great powers are working quietly on the use of atomic energy in aviation, where the military aspect of the problem is, perhaps, predominant at present, since atomic energy would be a great advantage over the conventional fuels. If we take into account that atomic energy will in time replace all the fuels now used in industry, we can grasp how important it will be in the future, and how great a role it will play in the economies of individual countries and in the economy of the world generally. Considering things from this point of view, we can understand the interest of the economically underdeveloped countries in the new applications of this energy, which, due to its possibilities, is becoming an increasingly more important element in their endeavours to bridge the gap which now divides them from the advanced countries. We can justify their fear that this gap could be further widened if atomic energy remains to be the monopoly of the countries which are now economically far ahead of others. All statesmen and economists are, to a greater or smaller extent, aware that the countries which today lag behind in the field of atomic energy may, in a few years' time, be left far behind. Therefore, all countries find it necessary at least to follow the progress of atomic science so as to be able to use it to their advantage in the future. At present many countries are taking their first steps in this direction — training technicians and opening institutions which are to work for the practical application of the results achieved in experimental laboratories.

Very important, although less known, is the research work on atomic fuels. At present only several different fuels are known,

and it is improbable that experiments are restricted to them alone. Many indications point to the fact that the great powers are looking for new atomic fuels. It is this research work which might lead to new and revolutionary discoveries that increases the role of atomic energy in international relations. The results already achieved, and the possible new discoveries, may lead to fundamental changes in industry — changes which would inevitably affect the social and international relations and so necessitate a revision of the present forms of relations between States and the introduction of new conceptions and methods in their intercourse. It is in this sense that we ought to interpret certain statements made by a number of leading politicians who demand that the development of atomic energy be strictly controlled, so as to prevent sudden and difficult social upheavals (industrial revolutions and the like). Various international actions of a regional or a definite ideological character are undertaken for this purpose, so as to control the application of atomic energy and direct its development in the international sphere, to bring this development in accord with the present day political conceptions and groups. The basic idea of such endeavours is, it seems, to maintain and preserve the present alignment during the future, unpredictable developments of the material means of production.

If we take into consideration also the military aspects of the atomic energy problem, it will be seen that our views are not exaggerated. The great powers still lay the greatest emphasis on the military use of atomic energy, which is shown by their recent blasts of new bombs of extraordinary power, and by the introduction of atomic weapons in their armies. In this field the application of atomic energy is made easier because no thought is given to the problem of the protection of the population from radiation as in its application in peacetime projects. Similarly, the question of costs and economical production does not arise in military experiments. Today it is evident that great and strong are those powers which use atomic energy chiefly for military purposes, and which have at their disposal the necessary raw materials and other equipment. Although individual regional groups now establish cooperation only in peacetime uses of atomic energy, they cannot avoid being linked with the military blocs if they depend exclusively on one of the great powers for the supply of raw materials and equipment.

Since international cooperation in the development of peacetime uses of atomic energy is in its initial stage, it is too early to draw any definite conclusions. But we can at this stage foresee the trends of the developments in this cooperation. The forming of separate groups in the East and in the West shows that the existence of the blocs is being prolonged. These groups seem small and they do not perhaps comprise all the countries of one bloc, but their linking with the great powers is the best evidence that the old structure of the blocs is being preserved. Although it is not quite clear and determined, the structure of EVRATOM and other institutions of European cooperation joins only the West European countries. No matter how many plausible political and economic reasons may be forwarded for the setting up of European cooperation in the field of atomic energy, which we shall not discuss here, this Western exclusiveness and its dependence on the sources of fuels can be taken as an endeavour to settle the problem of atomic energy solely on the basis of the Western bloc. Similarly, judging by some agency reports, a tendency of the same kind also exists in Eastern Europe, where six countries are reported to be drawing up a joint plan for the development of the peacetime uses of atomic energy. Here, too, the group of the said six countries would be dependent on a single great power for special materials and technical assistance. Accordingly, the trends of development are evident, but it is yet to be seen whether this develop-

ment will progress in this direction. If it does it will only increase the difficulties and differences between the two sides.

Today all States are not in a position, economically, to keep in step with the great powers in the development of atomic energy. It would be futile for them all to try and develop atomic science in all its fields and to become fully independent in this respect. Therefore, every country strives for international cooperation, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis. For small countries the Geneva atomic energy conference of last year was of great importance, because it opened prospects for real international cooperation without any political conditions. But it seems that the fate of the Geneva conference held by heads of governments began to endanger its results. Taking into account the existing differences in the development and in the material possibilities of individual regions of the world, international cooperation, based on the acceptable principles of international relations, is possible within the United Nations. In addition to bilateral agreements, under which individual States try to solve the most essential problems in the field of atomic energy, so as not to lag behind in the development of science and to be able to train the necessary technicians, there is also the possibility of multilateral cooperation within a smaller or larger number of countries in any given region regardless of their social order and political conceptions. The fundamental basis of such cooperation should be a resolve to develop

the peacetime uses of atomic energy for the prosperity of people and for the good of humanity. Such cooperation can be established very easily in Europe which, taken together, has at its disposal both the raw materials and the industrial potential for the development of atomic energy and for its uses in peacetime projects. Naturally, all countries are not interested in all forms of cooperation in this sphere, and they cannot all take part in joint actions. Voluntary decision in this should be the basic rule if the equality of partners is accepted. It is yet too early to start solving of important international and legal questions of super-nationality and integration in a higher form than that which may be voluntarily accepted in individual areas, since any premature obligations would retard — if not prevent — cooperation in the international sphere and in the United Nations. The complexity of the problem of international cooperation will grow as the facts and practical uses of atomic energy increase. This cooperation will in time assume so broad proportions that it will affect many fields of the national economies, the State legislation of individual countries, as well as international relations and obligations, so that only a universal organization, based on the principles of the United Nations, with all the States of the world as its members, will be capable of resuming the responsibility for solving future problems of this kind.

THE WASHINGTON TALKS

Stojan KOVAČEVIĆ

As expected, the agenda of the meeting of the United States and British heads of state included more or less all the major contemporary problems, both on the general plane of world policy and that of Anglo-American relations. Although a series of problems were referred to in the declaration and communiqué issued after the meeting it is obvious that much still remained shrouded by a veil of diplomatic secrecy and that some time would have to elapse before all the subjects of the Washington talks are disclosed.

The Washington talks can be contemplated from two standpoints: i. e. their effect on the world atmosphere in general (in other words their repercussion on the development of contemporary international relations) and second, their effect on the mutual relations of the two partners (namely, whose attitudes prevailed on the individual issues). Needless to say, various opinions were voiced on this score. The impression prevails however that on this occasion the hosts were more persuasive than their guests on a spate of major problems, or at least that the arguments advanced by the guests were not strong enough to make the hosts change their views. The first aspects of the Washington talks, their effect on the general international situation, should also be contemplated in close connexion with the foregoing. Apart from the tendency of bloc exclusivity which, let it be said, is not only characteristic for the Washington partners and terminology (as it was couched more or less in terms generally adopted by international courtesy) the documents of the meeting were not considered in the world as a sign of renewed international tension. Unfortunately they even fall short of the most reasonable and cautious expectations, i. e. of representing a contribution to the further pacification and favourable development of world affairs.

The Washington talks were regarded in many quarters as an opportunity for the re-examination and re-estimation of the Western attitude in the present dynamic situation thus making the absence of France all the more conspicuous as it was impossible to explain the latter by the government crisis and the still fluid internal political situation. Memories of the meetings of Western statesmen in which French representatives took part notwithstanding a similar or even more difficult situation at home are still too vivid. Many are inclined to interpret the French absence as an expression of the Anglo-Saxon disapproval of the new tendencies in French policy which are gaining increasing force and recently received their official confirmation in some passages of the declaration issued by the new French government. It should be added, however, that the Washington partners are both conscious of the

significance and aware of the potential possibilities of the French policy, having also included France already at the first stage. The fulfilment of the conclusion reached on the Near East, the French absence in Washington, as well as the omission in the communiqué of certain problems towards which the French policy (contemplated from the broader aspect of peace and international cooperation) maintains a positive attitude (in addition to certain other considerations) might imply that the Anglo-Saxon partners (while not abandoning French cooperation when it coincides with their immediate aims) nevertheless give preference to American-British unity over integrated Western cooperation. It remains to be seen, even from the narrow Western point of view, whether such a course also offers any real possibilities.

The European problems, the Near East and the Far East represent the principal problems dealt with in the Washington communiqué. And in the present situation which is extremely liable to change the Atlantic policy and NATO remain the basic elements in the policy of the Anglo-Saxon powers. In the same way, as regards the European economic problems, cooperation and support are limited to the Western part of Europe. The United States and Great Britain continue to consider that „there can be no genuine and stable peace“ as long as Germany remains divided. The conception that Germany represents the principal problem without whose solution it is impossible to approach the successful consolidation of peace and international cooperation is no longer accepted unanimously at present, not even in the West. The view that the solution of the German problem must be approached in a „roundabout“ manner by means of the settlement of some other problems and in a way which would not upset the present balance of power is gaining increasing currency. In this light the reiteration and further definition of a well known attitude on the Berlin problem is not devoid of a certain negative imprint, although the provocation of this warning against any attempt to change the present state of affairs could be sought in certain intimations made on the opposite side.

Judging by the communiqué, the complicated situation in the Near East led to an agreement between the United States and Great Britain but apparently only on the fundamental line of policy. A more detailed analysis seems to indicate that in spite of a broad agreement on some points (reiterated denouncement of the Soviet political initiative in the Near East, pledges to maintain the status quo etc.), identity of views is lacking, however, several important aspects of the Mid-East problem. The British went to Washington, inter alia, to ensure closer American parti-

pation in the Bagdad pact and convince the American government of the need to influence Egypt and Syria to show greater understanding for the British policy in that part of the world, and last to settle some mutual differences primarily in connexion with the oil interests in Arabia. As shown by the communiqué, the American policy at the moment does not wish to go any further as regards its participation in the Bagdad pact, which will also henceforth be limited to the extension of its support to the objectives of the Pact and the participation of US observers in its commissions. Attention should be called to the sentence in which it is stressed that support of the Bagdad pact „provides no reason for impairing the good relations we wish to maintain with non member countries“. In view of the attitude prevailing in the Middle East and elsewhere towards the Bagdad Pact, it is difficult to conceive its further territorial expansion and internal strengthening if the Washington partners take scrupulous care not to impair their relations with the countries of this region which do not belong to the Pact. This seems to indicate that the United States do not deem it expedient to exert their influence on Egypt and Syria whose negative attitude towards the Bagdad Pact is the principal source of the difficulties encountered by the British policy in the Near East. It also seems that Eden fared no better with regard to the oil dispute. This is also confirmed by the reserved comments on the subject published in the British press.

South and Southeast Asia was also duly referred to in the communiqué but only as a flat re-statement of the attitude maintained so far primarily by the United States. The omission of Indo-China is also worthy of notice although this problem should at present be the cynosure of international interest. According to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, the final provisions of this instrument should be enforced by the plebiscite scheduled for this year.

The end of February has been set as the deadline for the talks between the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of Southern Viet Nam on the organisation of the plebiscite. There have been no signs so far that these talks will take place. Moreover, the initiative of Northern Viet Nam and of the People's Republic of China for a meeting of the powers concerned did not meet with a favourable reception on the other side. The attitude of the Diem Government in Southern Viet Nam indicates that it does not intend to carry out the provisions of the Geneva agreement. The attitude of the United States on the Indo-China problem is already known. It is considered disappointing, however, that Great Britain which played an important and constructive role in Geneva, has not succeeded in convincing her American partners in Washington that a reassessment of their attitude is necessary, in so far as the present silence does not imply a change in the British attitude towards the Indo-China problem.

In the case of the Far East the US-British talks defined the joint attitude of the two Governments only in broad lines by stating their intention „to deter and prevent aggressive expansion by force or subversion, and to assist the free nations of the area in their self-defence and in maintaining domestic stability and welfare.“ Although the communiqué also contains the reservation

„that some differences remain in our judgement as to the most effective means to achieve these purposes“, one may well ask whether the formula on the Far Eastern objectives imply a change in the British attitude concerning the South Korean regime or the Chiang Kai-Shek group or the Chinese situation for instance. In this light the American concession to lift the embargo on trade with China also assumes a different aspect. Under other conditions the statement by the US government that „trade controls should be reviewed now and periodically as to their scope“ would be far more significant. As part of the „strong arm policy“ towards China it loses much in value, although the present US internal situation should also be borne in mind in this context. The forces which oppose a constructive China policy are still strong in the United States, which is a considerably significant factor in the election year despite the undeniable authority of President Eisenhower.

The declaration on objectives is couched in general terms and leaves the attitudes of the two partners on a series of major problems undefined. Essentially, however, as appraised by some US commentators, it would rather seem intended for the broad areas of Asia and Africa than the United States and British public opinion. The fundamental conception of a world consisting of good and evil powers is inevitably devoid of value and cannot create the effect desired. In this connexion it is difficult to see why such a conception was necessary to States with such a great international prestige and responsibility. The most positive feature of the declaration is no doubt the solemn statement that the two powers do not intend to impose the solution of international problems by force (We reject the thought that the cleavage we have described should be resolved by force. We shall never initiate violence). Such statements are encouraging and could open new prospects for future endeavours to bring about a general pacification in the world. It should be regretted, however, that a more concrete stand of the Anglo-Saxon powers on some major world issues is lacking, as international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for instance, which is one of the foremost problems today. Except for general phrases there is nothing whatever on the subject in the declaration or communiqué. More or less the same treatment was accorded to disarmament. While also in the declaration the American policy was consistent in its non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states within the Soviet Union („what were once ten independent nations“) the British policy still owes an explanation to the world for that part of the declaration which is more or less incompatible with the British view on this problem at the time.

Owing to the different international climate, and the appearance and influence of new factors which were formerly non-existent or unimportant in world politics, as well as an entirely different trend of world public opinion, the actual extent of agreement between the American and British policy and the actual basis on which it was brought about still remain to be seen on concrete issues.

THE BAGDAD PACT

L. ERVEN

IN the beginning the Bagdad Pact expressed a simplified objective, but became notably complicated as soon as it came in direct contact with the Middle East realities. This may well have been expected as these realities are also extremely complex and intricate and therefore affect every action undertaken in that area to the same degree. In point of fact the situation in that part of the world is so complicated that it is frequently hard to determine whether certain factors and phenomena are causes or effects of other factors and phenomena. It could be said that in the case of the Middle East, policy-makers are often in the position of a physician who cannot decide whether a certain symptom should be taken as an indicator for diagnosis or therapy. It thus happens for instance that many actions undertaken

in the Middle East assume in the course of implementation quite a different complexion than before.

The Bagdad pact is also a case in point. It was started with the ambition to enlist all Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab states, into a defence organisation. The Pact failed on this score but succeeded in deepening the differences of views even between the Western powers as to the policy which should be adopted in the Middle East. Instead of uniting the Middle Eastern countries, the Bagdad Pact disunited the powers which aimed at the achievement of this unity. In a recent statement the American Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles declared that the establishment of a defence system in the northern part of the Middle East was originally an American idea, but that the United

States do not deem it expedient to join the Bagdad Pact, although the latter represents the fulfillment of their own idea. It is really unusual, to say the least, to see an initiator abandon his own initiative when the latter has already been realized in practice. This could be understood only if the initiative were alienated from its author and developed along entirely different lines.

Actually the Bagdad Pact had two predecessors from which it stems. It developed directly from the Turco-Iraqi Treaty of February 24, 1955, on mutual cooperation to which Great Britain, Pakistan and Persia adhered later on. The Turco-Iraqi Treaty had also a precedent, however: the Turco-Pakistani Treaty of April, 2, 1954 on friendly cooperation. These three, or to be more precise, two instruments, as the Bagdad Pact actually represents a more elaborate version of the Turco-Iraqi Treaty, mark three stages in the development of a specific policy aiming at the integration of the Middle East in the Western security system.

I

THE FOUR POWER DECLARATION OF 1951

The history of the Bagdad treaty actually began before actual talks between the future parties to the treaty were initiated. The roots of the political concept expressed in the Pact should be sought in an earlier scheme for the organisation of Middle Eastern defence drafted several years previously. The Bagdad Pact replaced this combination, and is all the more interesting because it provides vivid proof of the failure of this political concept, although still claiming to express it.

When the concept of a Middle Eastern Defence Organisation (MEDO) as expressed in a joint declaration of the United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey in October 1951, had to be definitely abandoned owing to Arab resistance and certain differences of view between the United States and Great Britain regarding the future course of action to be decided on this score. These differences of view were mainly limited to the following fundamental issue: whether to continue action on the enlistment of Arab cooperation with the western powers or approach the organisation of Middle Eastern defence under the prevailing conditions regardless of the Arab attitude.

This problem was further complicated by other phenomena which appeared in the Middle East at that time and which proved more significant for Great Britain than for the other signatories of the 1951 Declaration. The Cairo Government repudiated the Anglo-Egyptian Agreements on Suez and the Sudan and launched a campaign for the withdrawal of the British troops from the canal zone. The Persian Government nationalised the oil fields and deprived the Anglo-Iranian company of its concessions. These disputes, linked with the unilateral repudiation of treaties the term of which had not yet expired, must have been doubly unpleasant for Great Britain as they involved not only loss of prestige and material losses, but also provided an awkward precedent for other states in this area with whom Great Britain maintained no less significant political arrangements.

All these disputes, which threatened to gain in scope and frequency were not only unpleasant for Great Britain, however, as the widespread anti-British feeling was gradually converted into anti-Western tendencies, which transcended the Egyptian and Pakistan frontiers threatening to encompass all other peoples in the Middle Eastern area with the exception of Turkey and Pakistan. These tendencies were notably aggravated by the tension in the Arab world caused by their dispute with Israel and the support extended to the latter by certain Western countries. Briefly, the course of events in the Middle East since 1950 was unfavourable for the relations of these nations with the Western powers and it may be said that the original concepts on the need for a Middle Eastern security system were formed under the influence or these misgivings for the safety of Western positions caused by various Arab and other movements and protests.

The primary objective of the 1951 Four Power Declaration on the establishment of a Middle Eastern Command was to bring about such forms of cooperation between the Arab states and the parties to the declaration as would ensure the integration of this area in Western policy. As other organisations in this period, the Middle Eastern defence scheme was envisaged to ensure the implementation of certain common political objectives by means of military cooperation.

This plan of the four powers was rejected, among other reasons because of the untimely moment of its proposal. Besides, this scheme envisaged the enlistment of the Arab states for the defence of a danger they did not feel, while not giving them any guarantees whatever against the Israeli threat with which they were directly concerned. In addition, the Western initiative was taken at an inopportune moment when Egypt, backed by the other

Arab states, on behalf of the principle of independence which at that time constituted the general platform of the political struggle waged by the Arab world, was involved in a serious dispute with Great Britain. In the anti-Western psychosis which reigned at that time, the offer of the Western powers was most likely to appear as a trap to the independent Arab states.

After the Arab rejection of the Four Power Declaration, it was urged in certain British diplomatic quarters that the Middle Eastern command be established nonetheless. These circles considered Arab resistance temporary and contended that the Arab states would gradually adhere to this organization in which they would enjoy the benefits of foreign aid for the organisation of their own national armies. "One should open shop and display wares", was at that time the current metaphor in British circles "and the customers will come". In the meantime this organisation whose temporary headquarters were set up in Cyprus and whose forces consisted of the British troops stationed in the Middle East provided the nucleus of the new organisation, needless to say under British command, which may have been if not the immediate pretext, at least one of the principal pretexts for its elimination.

These suggestions were not accepted, as neither the United States nor France wished to get involved in disputes with the Arab states through such a combination foisted on them. The United States considered at that time that no security organisation in the Middle East could be established without the cooperation of the Arab states, and that such cooperation could not be achieved without the previous settlement of the outstanding disputes with Great Britain and Israel.

The Four Power Declaration was definitely rejected by the Arab states in 1951, and for almost two years no attempt was made to establish a similar system with or without the support and participation of the Arab states. Nor did the development in the Middle East provide a favourable opportunity for any step whatever in this respect. During these two years, as well as later on, the Middle East represented one of the principal areas of political unrest in the world, what with its disputes with Great Britain and the foreign oil companies, its disputes with Israel, the internal changes and coups in Egypt, Syria and Persia, the political assassinations in Lebanon and Jordan, the rivalries of the two Arab dynasties, the struggle for leadership within the Arab world, and primarily the sweeping tidal wave of resistance against the Western powers, their positions, policy and suggestion, and the endeavours made to preserve this area from getting involved in bloc antagonisms between East and West.

Under such conditions and under the influence of the international situation in general and the changes in the attitude of the individual powers, the elements of the original scheme envisaging a Middle Eastern Command were abandoned and these combinations replaced by others.

(to be continued in the next issue)



Unloading of barges in a river port

THE CODIFICATION OF DIPLOMATIC LAW

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DIPLOMATIC law, i. e. the rules of international law which determine the status of diplomatic agents, their rights in performing their functions, the rights of countries to open diplomatic missions in foreign countries, the rights of States which offer their hospitality to foreign diplomatic agents, and finally the intercourse between States, are, in their present form, the remnants of a tradition which was formed between 1648 (the Peace Treaty of Westphalia) and 1848 (the Third French Revolution). That was the period when the bourgeoisie was gaining in strength, i. e. when the bourgeoisie had not yet taken power in its hands completely or freed itself from feudal customs.

Although the ordinary man may find it surprising to hear the phrases used in diplomatic protocol and see diplomatic ceremonies, each of such phrases and the entire diplomatic intercourse and ceremonies have a symbolic significance, and they, together, are a guarantee against a possible violation of the rights the diplomatic agents enjoy in performing their functions independently of the States to which they are accredited. Due to these rights and privileges, diplomatic agents live a special kind of life, or, better said, they are, in a given centre, grouped in the so-called diplomatic corps, not only by their rights and duties, but also by their way of life, so that they make a community of their own.

What is the greatest shortcoming in diplomatic law is the uncertainty of its regulations. The tradition of the diplomatic procedure, which is partially sanctioned by written rules, but which for the most part depends on practices and memory, and which is based on rights and privileges, is uncertain in its contents, because it does not rely on the principle of rights but on customs. The respect of this tradition is not based on the rights of diplomatic agents the observance of which is binding for all States, but on customs of courtesy, i. e. customs of courtesy which States accord to each other.

On the other hand the material development of international law is not in stagnation. This law is developing together with the general progress of society. Today many rules of diplomatic law are in contradiction with the forms of diplomatic procedure, even with those which are legal rules and not mere acts of courtesy. If, for instance, we were to compare some institutions of diplomatic law with the material rules which are, under the United Nations Charter, equalized with the aims and principles of the present-day international community, and with both the customs and written rules of international law, we should from the outset have to conclude that they are in flagrant contradiction. Two examples will suffice to show this. Under the United Nations Charter all States are equal, and in practice this means that in international life States have the same rights, and that no differences in this respect are allowed. The principle of non discrimination is universal in character. Therefore, at the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly no delegates, not even those of the great powers, can claim extra privileges on account of their experience, age, qualifications or official duties in the Assembly. However, the representatives of States which enjoy sovereign equality, and even the permanent representatives of individual States in the United Nations are not of equal rank, which means that some States can delegate representatives of higher and some of lower rank, according to the rules set down at the Vienna Congress in 1815 and further elaborated at the Congress of Aachen in 1817, so that we today have ambassadors, plenipotentiary ministers, resident ministers and *chargés d'affaires*. According to the ideas which prevailed at the time when these two congresses were held, all States did not have the right to name ambassadors, for this right belonged only to the great powers and a few other States. Even today some States cannot name ambassadors, because their right to do so is not recognized by other States. This, however, is a remnant of the past which is not in keeping with the present equality of States as a modern principle on which international public life is based.

As another discrepancy between the conventional rules of international law and their present day application we shall mention the honours accorded to chiefs of States. The so-called ceremonies and honours which a State pays to its chief were in practice long before they were definitely accepted and approved at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The greatest of these are the so-called royal honours. However if the States are mutually independent and equal they should all be entitled to the same honours. From the first the chiefs of the republics - those anti-royal institutions - demanded that they too should be accorded the royal honours. They did so not only on the basis of courtesy, but also on the basis of the equality of States. The monarchies opposed their demand, but as the number of monarchies decreased their opposition became weaker and the success of the republics greater.

In international public law there are many rules which are in contradiction with the present rules of the United Nations. Most such rules are to be found in diplomatic law. They are all the remnants of past practices which were not adapted to the changing times as quickly as international law. For instance, international law regulates the rights of the wives but not of the spouses of diplomatic agents, because the bourgeois theory prevailed at the time when these rules were written that the husband was the person who works and performs public functions and that the wife only accompanies him. The international law of today makes no discrimination between men and women, and we find today - not in diplomacy to any great extent, it is true - men and women working as equals in many factories and institutions. In this situation it seemed somehow paradoxical when the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, Mrs. Kolontajna, asked that her husband be included in the list of diplomats. The chiefs of the Protocol in the Swedish Foreign Ministry had earlier been putting on the diplomatic list only the ambassadors and their wives. Today cases of this kind are not rare, but they are still exceptions. There are people who propose that the husbands of the ladies from the diplomatic corps should be given lower rank than the wives of diplomatic agents. As we see, discrimination is being proposed to the detriment of men in diplomacy itself.

What necessitates an urgent revision, or, at least a change in international law are the modern means of transport which were unknown to the times of the Westphalia Peace Treaty and the Congress of Vienna. In old laws we can find detailed rules concerning the coaches of diplomats and the relay of diplomatic coach drivers. Such rules also existed in Serbia at the time of Prince Miloš's rule, and they mentioned the imperial „*tartas*“ and the „*tartars*“ of other powers, i. e. diplomatic messengers. At that time diplomatic messengers used the quickest possible means of transport on state roads, i. e. coaches or stage-coaches. After coaches they took to trains and motorcars, and, presently, they use airplanes. All rules which were once applicable to diplomatic stage-coaches and coaches are now applicable to diplomatic airplanes, including helicopters which may, regardless of the customs regulations and authorities of a state, land directly into the courtyards of the embassies to which they belong. However, views are being voiced in many states that helicopters are only one kind of mail carriers, and that the guarantee against the violation of mail does not confer to any one also the right to violate the frontiers of foreign States, so that all diplomatic airplanes and helicopters should be bound to land on a customs airfield, from which diplomatic messengers or diplomats themselves can freely proceed to their missions and take the mail with them. According to these views a State is entitled to see whether diplomatic messengers carry only the mail, i. e. whether what they are carrying is packed and sealed as ordinary mail. In other words a State is entitled to force foreign States engaged in contraband i. e. their representatives, to present smuggling in an acceptable form and to control whether they act in accordance with relevant rules.

A similar problem is presented also by the principle of free communications between the chiefs of diplomatic missions and

their governments, i. e. the principle - recognised since the 17th century - that the chief of a diplomatic mission can sent to and receive various messages from his government without any interference from the State to which he is accredited. But, while earlier such messages had to be coded, packed and sealed, now most of the diplomatic missions have their own wireless telegraphy offices and operators. Usually they have transmitting and receiving stations, as well as a teleprinter. The latter is a machine linked with the general wireless telegraphy network, which leaves a material trace of all messages a mission receives. As technology advances, diplomats get increasingly greater possibilities for the abuse of these and similar advances. Therefore, progress, instead of developing confidence and trust among States, makes States alarmed because foreign diplomats are in a position to use modern means of communications without their knowledge, and because important messages often pass between diplomats and their government without any outward signs. The jamming of transmissions by various embassies is therefore constantly being discussed. Endeavours are being made to adapt the wireless network of the embassies to the general wireless network of the State in which they work, so as to enable such a State to learn, in an indirect way, by decoding various codes secretly, something of what is going on. Modern means of communications, on the other hand, create difficulties for all. First, a State which offers its hospitality to foreign diplomats feels insecure, and secondly, the States represented by these diplomats are not sure whether their right to free and secret communications is violated or not.

Yet another problem is the personal protection of diplomats and the protection of their missions. The rules on these matters remained unchanged. The personality and the rights of a diplomat are inviolable. Today diplomatic missions all over the world have - in principle - a symbolic guard as a sign of the obligation of the States to protect their privileges and immunity. This symbolic protection is the guard who stands at the entrance of the missions, and who is aware that he has no right of intervention beyond the threshold of the mission. On the other hand, the missions themselves do not expect him to protect them, for if an attack is to be made it would certainly be made by persons capable of overpowering a single guard. But the essence of the matter does not lie in this symbolic protection and its weakness. It lies in the changing moods. During the Second World War all rules concerning the inviolability of diplomats and diplomatic missions were disregarded. Some States considered it their right to force their way into foreign embassies and to confiscate their documents as well as to try publicly their charges d'affaires for what they had allegedly done. With this, such States took the right to try at least some of the diplomats for what they had done while they enjoyed diplomatic immunity. The inciting of the masses against foreign diplomats necessitated the passing of some special rules which did not correspond to the conventional conceptions of the inviolability of diplomats and with the old fiction of the sacred personality of a diplomatic agent.

Encouraged by such acts, and freed from old patterns, new diplomacy, particularly after World War II, went to work without paying any attention to international courtesy which, together with laws, ensured the development of the theory of diplomacy. As a result, there were violations of international law. We know that after the war there were serious conflicts which would have earlier been considered as violations of the rules and as insults to foreign States, so that the insulted State would have had the right, as well as a kind of moral obligation to declare and wage war against the State which had insulted it. At present we have a paradox: war is forbidden, and there are no rules under which it would be possible to punish a State which disregards the obligation to refrain from insulting other States. Even in the inter-war period a State in whose territory the flag of another country was violated during demonstrations was forced to make excuses formally by ordering a company of soldiers with their regimental colours to salute the violated flag. No such formalities have taken place after the war, although the flags and missions of foreign countries were often violated in individual countries.

But let us leave the dead symbols aside and consider the living persons. Even in this respect there are no precise rules. At one time Europe differentiated the diplomats of higher and lower ranks. Only the so-called higher diplomats enjoyed diplomatic immunity. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon theory held that diplomatic personnel of lower rank too enjoyed this immunity in so far as they accompanied the envoy, so that their immunity was, in essence, only the reflection of the envoy's immunity. In this States were not all in agreement and divided themselves in two groups. At present a large number of States back up the European conception, while some European States, including the Federal Republic of Germany, are in favour of the Anglo-Saxon theory. The practice, as a result, became uncertain. The United Nations did not intervene, or better said, intervened in a negative manner.

The differences in the social development of individual States which maintain diplomatic relations led to the adoption of special rules which prescribe the rights of diplomats and restrict their movements in some States. We are, for instance, all aware of the restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government on the freedom of movement of diplomats and of the Western reaction to these restrictions. It was only in 1954 that Great Britain definitely reacted to the Soviet measures by introducing similar restrictions for the Soviet diplomats. In the British opinion the statute on the rights of diplomats and the freedom of their movement all over the State to which they are accredited is a rule of conventional law which is still in force. Accordingly, Britain holds that the restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government are a violation of international law which is still in force. Accordingly, Britain holds that the restrictions imposed by the Soviet Government are a violation of international law in principle. Such restrictions can be justified if they are applicable to all and if they do not completely prevent the diplomats from performing their duties. On the other hand, Great Britain holds that the envoy of a State cannot demand greater rights than those which his State grants to the diplomats of the country in which he is accredited. Theoretically, a conflict broke out over the question whether this was a kind of discrimination or not. According to the Soviet view every State can determine rules which must be respected by foreign diplomats. No international standards exist. The main thing is not to apply any discrimination between the representatives of different States. On the contrary, the British view holds that a foreign diplomat cannot interfere in the home affairs of the State to which he is accredited, but that he is free to move over its entire territory, for otherwise he cannot be correctly informed about what is going on in that State, and it is his duty to be an observer of matters and to inform his government. If a State restricts the movements of foreign diplomats it does so because it probably believes that the diplomats can perform their functions even with such restrictions in force. A country which introduces restrictions, the British say, cannot demand for its diplomats in foreign countries any greater rights than it grants to foreign diplomats to whom it gives its hospitality. In this way new differences in diplomacy, as well as a new kind of discrimination, are introduced. First, all States do not treat foreign diplomats equally, and, secondly, diplomats are treated differently in those States which hold that the freedom of movement of diplomats cannot be restricted, but which introduce restrictions on the movements of the diplomats of those countries in which their own representatives are subjected to various restrictions.

These and many other violations of international diplomatic law by individual States - violations which did not occur earlier and which cannot be settled owing to the lack of relevant rules, led many States to ask the United Nations to codify diplomatic law. A formal request for this came from Yugoslavia. Following her proposal a resolution was passed recommending that the United Nations International Law Commission should consider the codification of rules on diplomatic intercourse. The United Nations General Assembly, too, asked the Commission to take this matter in consideration. The international Law Commission is a body composed of fifteen prominent lawyers from all over the world who work slowly but conscientiously. It will soon begin this great task. The bases for the codification of diplomatic law are to be put down at the meeting of the Commission in Geneva in April. A series of former institutions will have to be changed because they do not correspond to the principle of the equality of States, and some other because they have become obsolete, contrary to the modern way of life. Furthermore, the codification of diplomatic law is necessary to remove the differences in the application of international law, and to regulate in a scientific way the rights of States not to respect the rules which determine the rights of diplomats, i. e. to settle what the diplomats are entitled to, what represents usurpation of their rights. Here, too, attention will have to be given to the progressive development of international law. Inequalities cannot be eliminated merely by sanctioning what already exists. It will, therefore, be necessary to take a definite attitude towards the opposing and contradictory rules, so as to determine what is a legal obligation, to see whether it corresponds to the present day reality. In all this, the Commission will have to be guided by the United Nations Charter as a relevant level of progress reached by international law. What is required is the uniformity of practice, but the practice of diplomatic intercourse must be based on full respect of all States which must be ensured in the same way. The new law must sanction the equality of big and small countries, as well as guarantee that democracy, which prevails in the intercourse between people and in the United Nations General Assembly, will be respected also in the intercourse between diplomats themselves. The rules which will be drawn up should be firm, simple and in harmony with the equality of States and people and with the democratic conceptions of the world.

DILEMMAS OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

J. ŽIVIC

THE West German Social Democrats, as we all know, are resolutely insisting on the unification of the country. Considering that unification is the fundamental task of the German people, they give top priority to this problem, i. e. they link it with other problems in so strict a manner that the realization of their economic and political programme becomes dependent on the possibility of applying it within a scope which would overlap the limits of the present division of the country into two State formations with different internal orders. In their programme and daily practice they have been giving priority to foreign political considerations, believing that it was possible in that way to fight most successfully for the realization of their chief aim, while the ruling coalition has always been of the opinion that the unification of the country should be sought through the all round strengthening of the Federal Republic in close collaboration with the Western bloc, thus creating material conditions likely to facilitate the solution of the problem in a way that would lead to the incorporation of the Eastern part of the country into the Federal Republic. The Social Democrats demanded from the very beginning an agreement of the four great powers, and opposed the one-sided orientation of the Bonn Government. Furthermore they refuse to recognize the regime in Eastern Germany, defending in essence the constitutional order which is in force in the Federal Republic. So far their efforts have not produced any result because the Social Democrats themselves were unable to exert any greater influence on the course of developments since the government has been firmly in the hands of Adenauer's party which appears in the international sphere as a representative of the German people and is fully backed up by the Western Powers which consider it to be the legal ruling party in Germany. The failure of the Geneva conference to set up a joint platform of the great powers for the solving of the German problem, the restoration of military and political sovereignty to the Eastern and Western German States, and the internal development of the Federal Republic, forced the Social Democrats to reconsider the conceptions on which their political actions had been based earlier and to establish a programme sufficiently attractive to the voters who will go to the polls to elect a new Bundestag next year.

With this aim in view a special congress was recently held in Cologne, at which the leading executives of the party were all present, and it revealed that there is a tendency within the party to modify its course of action and pay greater attention to the home political problems. Even so, the unification of the country, as Adenauer himself said, will remain the subject of all discussions, and an internal political programme, which will envisage Germany as a whole, will be adopted. The Social Democrats are of the opinion that a reunited Germany should not be a people's democracy as imagined by Pankow nor a state with the social order which is now in force in the Federal Republic. They hold that it is necessary to fight for a social system which would be freed both from totalitarian pressures and from the attempts of the reactionary forces to restore the earlier system, for these forces endanger the democratic institutions and the civil freedoms of the Federal Republic by their endeavours to strengthen their own positions and to subordinate the national interests to their own aims.

The Cologne Congress thoroughly discussed three problems: civil liberties, social reforms and economic policy. In as far as the first of these problems is concerned, the Congress underlined the various dangers which threaten the freedoms of the citizens, the negative tendencies which came to expression in the social life of the West German State, for which all the blame was laid on the government and the forces which rely on it. Particularly criticized was the new draft of the election law, which was described as an attack on the free determination of people in the government coalition, i. e. among Free Democrats, because it favours the Christian Democrats. Also criticized were the attempts to restrict the validity of civil marriage and to enforce the concordat which Hitler had concluded with the Vatican. The Social Democrats evidently wish to engage in the defence of the constitutional liberties and in the

fight against the tendencies to restrict the liberties gradually and to interpret them as it suits the ruling circles.

The Congress devoted considerable attention to the problems of social reforms, which are deemed necessary both by the government and the opposition, and which will probably play a great part in the forthcoming election campaign. The most urgent matter in this sphere is the need to increase the old age pensions of workers and employees. The Social Democrats propose that the old age pensions of workers and employees should amount to 75% of their regular wages and salaries. The age limit is to remain 65, and it is subsequently to be reduced for women and miners. The fundamental aim of the social insurance reform is to place it on a different basis, so that it could from time to time be revised and brought in accord with the living costs and the average standard of living. No doubt, many duels will be fought by the government and the opposition until a final agreement on this reform is reached. One of the mooted issues at present is the question of the total amount of social expenditures and the manner of financing them. The opposition for instance maintains that the government has saved a considerable sum — about 6 billion marks — which it intends to invest in armaments and that, in spite of that, it rejects the proposal of the Social Democrats to increase grants to war victims, saying that it has no funds at its disposal. But the government itself will certainly come to see that the increasing of pensions and social aids is, during the election campaign, a more popular and profitable measure than the burdening of the taxpayers with heavy defence expenditures, even if it said that armaments stimulate economic activities. Adenauer himself said that his government this year will give priority to the passing of a new law on social insurance.

The Congress of the Social Democrat leaders also considered the principles of the party's economic programme. In this it concluded that the economic advance made by Western Germany last year was not accompanied by a corresponding increase of the workers' participation in the distribution of the national income. The greatest share of the national income was taken by the capitalists who tended to restore the old cartel practices in new forms and to increase the political influence of private capital. It was also shown that certain dangers threaten the present prosperity (disproportions between individual branches of industry, excessive investments, inflation tendencies and so on). In order to improve this negative situation the Social Democrats say that the present high level of production should be maintained by ensuring full employment through State measures which would be independent of the monopoly groups. They further propose that defence expenditures should be decreased and all excesses in this sphere which may cause upheavals in economy avoided. It is interesting that the Social Democrats are in favour of free competition, which is one of the decisive methods in their policy, while they propose that monopolies should be placed under control. Their economic programme as a whole is very moderate, especially in as far as ownership relations and co-management in industry are concerned, because it does not put forward any new demands, being satisfied with the achievements already made in co-management which were some time ago subjected to sharp attacks by the opponents of the scheme (now a draft law is being considered by the Bundestag which would annul the rights of workers to co management in all large concerns of the coal and steel industries). A principled attitude was taken towards atomic energy, in whose development, in the opinion of the Social Democrats, private ownership should not be a decisive factor. It is necessary to mention here that the Social Democrats, contrary to their earlier practices, are now drawing up plans for further steps on economic and political integration, particularly in the sphere of atomic energy. Thus the Social Democrats have been very active in Monnet's Committee for the United States of Europe where they supported the idea of a joint organization of the six countries for the research and development of atomic energy — an organization which would have such great powers as the Social Democrats had never been previously willing

to give any institution in the sphere of military and political integration.

The Congress defined the social democratic conception in this field as an economic policy of „social justice and freedom” which tends to correct the unjust distribution of the national income (the Social Democrats maintain that in the Federal Republic there are 250 people who have an annual income of over a million marks while there are about 6 million people whose monthly income does not exceed 150 marks, which is the minimum for existence).

As is seen, the Cologne Congress considered a great many home political problems, but did not pass any radical recommen-

dations (the final decisions on all these problems will be taken at the regular Party Congress, which will probably be held in the Summer of this year). No one can say at present to what extent the demands the Social Democrats propose to put forward in their election campaign will attract the voters and be able to oppose the present trends in social developments which are backed up by the conservative forces. For the Social Democrats have not given up their fundamental foreign political views, the most important of which is that the future international status of a united Germany should be determined by an agreement between the powers concerned and that it cannot be prejudiced by any obligations arising from the present military blocs.

Economic Problems

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

V. MILENKOVIĆ

THE twelfth session of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was opened in Bangalore (India) early in February this year. This session was rendered particularly significant by the presence of the Indian Premier Nehru and UN Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld. In contrast to the previous session, this one derives its significance from the fact that it is being held at a time when the Soviet Union is changing its methods of foreign economic policy and when differences between the Eastern and Western blocs are being intensified in the sphere of international economic action in under-developed countries. These differences also contributed to placing in the forefront the problems of the methods and practice of the policy of developed countries in relation to the Asian and generally under-developed states. These questions were the main points in Nehru's opening speech. Hammarskjöld mentioned them in part. Their viewing of the problems of Asian countries and peoples — problems of under-developed countries generally — constitute a kind of platform from which these problems should be approached and solved.

Nehru first spoke about the project of creating a special UN Fund for helping the economic development of under-developed countries; he emphasized that it would be „more proper and better to organize this assistance through the United Nations”. In his opinion this would be „better for both those who give aid and those who receive it”, better „both from the viewpoint of aims and from the viewpoint of results”. This idea actually reflects the idea of the necessity of aid to under-developed countries — which is no longer a disputed question — but in such a way that it should take the form of an international action. This would condition its freeing from various bilateral and regional frames, which are more or less conditioned by bloc policy considerations.

Mr Shvein, the UN Commissioner for question relating to the Special Fund recently drew attention to this matter. On his return from a trip to India, where he made a study of the conditions on the basis of a UN mandate, he emphasized the need for „the creation of a new organization which would give substantial gifts and grant long-term loans at low interest rates”. It is indispensable to extend aid, said Shvein, through an international organization and not bilaterally. It is an equally important condition that aid should not be linked with any political conditions. No doubt, here lies the essence of the problem of effective assistance to the development of under-developed countries — it is all-important that aid should be an object of international action and that it should be free of any bloc conceptions which are still dominant.

As regards the methods of the aid-giving policy, Nehru also pointed out „that the individual progress of Asia, the destiny of this continent, could not be decided in distant places regardless of

Asian feeling or opinion and without Asian cooperation”. This is actually the problem of relations between countries which give assistance and countries which receive it. Its essence is reduced to two opposing conceptions on the organization and character of international relations: the conception of international cooperation on the one hand and the conception of antagonistic blocs, including cooperation inside blocs on the other. The conflict between these conceptions is becoming ever more acute. It is also expressed in connection with the question of assistance, in the attempts of countries which provide assistance to maintain the old practice in new forms — a practice which is intended to preserve the essential characteristics of relations of dependence and submission, and the attitude of aid — receiving countries which are increasingly resisting old practices and old methods.

In these contradictions between countries — aid givers and beneficiaries, there exist conditions for such a situation in which aid to under-developed countries is increasingly expressed as a definite attitude. This attitude, however, contains an ever more emphasized tendency toward the independence of countries receiving aid. They are also becoming an ever more significant factor of opposition to bloc policy which following the appearance of the Soviet Union on the international economic plane, has been showing tendencies to a stonger orientation towards economic and social problems, of course in the framework of political, military and strategic plans and objectives. At the same time this is giving rise to growing differences between the two conceptions of international relations; these differences are based on the growing disproportion between the level of productive forces and markets.

In Nehru's estimation, „the disproportion in economic progress between industrially developed countries of Asia has become much greater during the last ten years”. Some data in the report of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East also draw attention to this fact. This does not lessen the significance of imminent progress which has been recorded in some of these countries since the war. But when comparing their development with the simultaneous development in the developed countries, then one finds that it is slower. This points to the continued existence of difference in the rate of development at the expense of under-developed countries. This made the problem of unequal development in the world even more complex and momentous; but now a large number of politically independent countries have become an active factor in the struggle against backwardness.

The UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East states that the agricultural production of this area is far from meeting its own domestic needs and providing the necessary surpluses for export which would ensure capital and other necessary

products. Calculated per capita agricultural production in the 1954/55 period was by 14% lower than the production of average products in the 1934—1938 period. Therefore, here occurs a relatively big drop in production, which means that post-war production is not yet developing proportionately to the growth of the population. The average annual grain production (rice, wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, broom-corn) in the 1934—38 period ran to 104.3 million tons, and was 113.7 million tons in 1954—1955, which means that it rose by only 9%. In the meantime the same period was characterized by a 25—30% increase in the agricultural production in developed countries. The report stresses that such a state of agricultural production in these countries is a serious obstacle in the way of their economic development. For some countries this means a reduction of exports, for others an increase of food imports. India, which succeeded in doing without substantial food imports is an exception in this type of agricultural production.

FOOD IMPORTS TO INDIA

Year	Wheat (in 1000 tons)	Rice
1951	2,977.8	749
1952	2,459.1	722
1953	1,612.3	190
1954	196.6	603
1955	466.0	265

Grain imports to India in the 1952—1954 period declined from 4,725,000 to 730,000 tons or by nearly 85%. India succeeded in solving the problem of agricultural production, for the time being, but not for a longer period as there remains the question of conditions ensuring the stability of the level achieved. The creation of these conditions is to provide for a further rise in production proportionally to the growth of the population and the improvement of the living standard.

Industrial production in these countries shows a relatively bigger progress. Industrialization has become the basic characteristic of their economic policy, economic plans and economic development. This is at the same time the most significant economic result of their altered political situation, a factor which exerts an ever stronger influence on the changes in their social and political structure. The chief industrial countries in this area are China, India and Japan. Industrial production in these countries in 1955 showed a 5 to 15% increase as compared to the situation in 1954. In other countries of this area, industrial production grew somewhat more slowly. If we except Japan, industrial production is no longer limited to consumer goods, but is developing today on an ever larger scale and embraces means of production also. Special attention has been devoted to basic industrial production (steel, cement, electric energy). In the sphere of electric energy emphasis is laid on the exploitation of water power as these countries, with the exception of China, India and partly Japan, have no coal deposits of any importance.

The differences in the degree and rate of industrial production development also stem from the distribution of energy sources. The bulk of this area's coal production is centred in China, Japan and India. Naphtha is chiefly to be found in China, Indonesia and Borneo. Japan alone produces and consumes considerable surpluses of electric energy from all the countries in this area. This is at the same time an indication of their backwardness. Similar differences exist in the field of iron and steel production. The projects now under construction in India, Pakistan and China are to ensure a considerable rise in production within a few years.

India and China show a sensible progress in the increase of their machine production. The new Five Year Plans in these countries augur a considerable increase of production in this branch of industry. The cement industry is developing in all countries; in addition to the existing 25 cement factories, India envisages the erection of another 20, as well as an increase of production from the present 4.18 million tons to 10 million tons. It is on the way to become a cement exporter. The chemical industry has concentrated on artificial fertilizers and soda, especially caustic soda etc. The textile industry is developing in all countries very rapidly. The number of spindles in the cotton industry of Pakistan exceeded 2,000,000 towards the end of 1955 (as against 793,000 in 1954). The plant capacities at present in operation are fully meeting the needs of the home market in ordinary textiles. India has already become one of the leading countries in the world export of cotton textiles (in 1954 its exports reached the figure of 736 million meters).

The economic plans of these countries, with the exception of China, are devoting equal attention to industry, agriculture and transport. The Chinese plan attaches exceptional importance to heavy industry. The industrial development is financed mostly by public funds which are steadily increasing. State budgets are covering a growing share of the national income, while they are increasingly being used for investment in economic construction. The

central problem in financing investments is how to increase funds. One of the characteristics of these efforts is the rapid setting up of credit institutions for mobilising savings. The banks of issue have considerably expanded their activity in the sphere of credits. A number of semi-state financial corporations (India, Pakistan, the Philippines etc) have been set up. They actually constitute the first organizational forms of home capital market. But besides this, the present economic development indicates that national accumulation is less and less capable of ensuring a quicker rate of development, a rate which would gradually mitigate the existing inequality.

Data on the foreign policy of these countries also point to the need for a quicker rate of development of production. Industrialization demanded an ever greater utilization of raw materials which used to be exported. However, in order to ensure quicker development, to increase exports in proportion to the steadily growing need of imports (especially of investment means), the problem of production became increasingly acute. What is involved here was not only an increase of the volume of production in its present structure; the question of diversification of agricultural production and industrial raw materials is becoming more and more significant. The latter problem became more and more acute for rice-exporting countries (Burma and Thailand) which are also faced with limited possibilities for placing their products on the world market and with a sharp competition from American exports.

The participation of these countries in world exports was 9% in 1955 as against 11% in 1950 and 12% in 1951 i. e. at the time of the boom in raw materials due to the war in Korea. During the years 1951—1955 world exports were increased by about 5% while exports from this area declined by 21%. The sensible decline of exports from the Asian area results from fact that 60% of their exports consist of eight raw material items the prices of which have fallen and which have suffered a decrease of their buying power in the purchase of industrial products. The imports of these countries in 1955 compared to 1954 increased by about 4%. Changes in the structure of imports — an increasing switch-over to the import of investment — also remained a characteristic for 1955. The percentile increase of import of this equipment was double the average increase of the total imports. From the viewpoint of these countries, the Soviet offers were significant for supplies of investment goods. Burma succeeded in ensuring the import of equipment for certain of its projects on the basis of payment with rice exports. The new trade agreement with the USSR provides India with the possibility of importing, during the next three years, one million tons of steel which it was unable to secure elsewhere.

Examining last year's economic and social development in this area, the report of the UN Economic Commission stresses several positive circumstances. It points to the process of improvement of the economic structure, the setting up of national cadres, the building up of the credit system, the improvement in the organization and functioning of the administrative machinery. The most important fact is considered to be the rise in industrial production which in many branches exceeds the rates of the population growth. But there remains, as a basic question, the need to ensure such a rate of development as would gradually tone down the differences now existing between this area and the developed countries. Nehru pointed out in his speech at the opening of the session that the „rhythm and speed of development must be quicker and greater“. Hammarskjöld expressed the same idea by emphasizing the need for international assistance to these countries: „Although economic and social progress in any country has to be mainly the result of its own activity, based on its own efforts, an important question confronts the economically progressive countries and the United Nations, namely that what we have achieved and what we have at our disposal is too inadequate in view of requirements“. In a statement made after his trip to India Mr. Shvein referred to the social and political aspect of the problems these countries have to cope with. In his own words „he — as a Christian socialist and a man who does not accept the communist ideology — has reached the point where he must ask himself whether communism is not a solution for under-developed countries“. According to him, it is certainly necessary to increase agricultural production and production of raw materials in the under-developed countries but it is of the utmost importance to enable these countries to build their own industry. The conclusion of his statement — that one third of mankind live well, and two thirds in material conditions which are worse than those provided for cattle in developed countries, that 85% of the national income goes to one third of the world population; that peace will not be ensured in the world as long as these differences subsist — may serve as a memento to all those who approach the solution of this problem from the positions of bloc policy, new partition of the world or domination over the world.

THE LAST IMPERIALIST STRONGHOLD IN INDIA

INTERNATIONAL developments during the last two years abounded in interesting moments; new events occurred in a series of important world problems fully engaging the attention of the world, so that some of the smaller problems, no matter how interesting in themselves, were brushed aside. One of such problems, small in scope, but easy of solution to normal human reasoning, has been attracting the attention of the world public opinion chiefly on account of the absurdity of the situation which has been created around it. The matter in question is the small Portuguese colonial possession on the Western shore of the Indian sub-continent — Goa. This almost miniature colonial possession — miniature in comparison with the huge Indian territory surrounding it and the vastness of other colonial possessions — today no longer constitutes a particularly valuable asset: it is about 4,000 square metres in area, with about half a million inhabitants — practically all Indians, without an economy of any significance. This little colony is a remnant of the extensive Portuguese empire of the past.

More than four hundred years ago Goa was conquered by the famous navigator and adventurer Alfonso de Albuquerque called „the Great“ and the „Portuguese Mars“. Wrestling Goa from its ruler Yusuf Adil Shah, he shed oceans of blood on taking the town, where he massacred 60,000 inhabitants. This, in view of the possibilities of war destruction in those times, is certainly one of the biggest massacres. Thus, part of the live body of India came under the sway of men from remote Portugal. In its subsequent history Goa became the base for further conquests of Portuguese sea navigators and „Marses“ who throughout the Southern parts of Asia extended the possessions of their Christian king, „protector of religion“, by wielding their sword. At about the same time Goa saw the arrival of direct emissaries of the Church, that powerful ally of all campaigns in the „lands of the infidels“. They came to „spread the faith“. For a long time, Goa was also an important centre of church missionaries; at one time it was the seat of the archbishopric whose head received from the Pope the title of „Primate of the East“, and his authority extended from the Cape of Good Hope in Africa all the way to China. The Golden times of Portuguese colonialists approached their end when the Dutch in the seventeenth century deprived them of their sea supremacy. With the decline of the colonial power of Portugal, came the decline of Goa as well, which was well-known in the sixteenth century for the wealth of its Portuguese colonists and for the luxury in which they lived. Very soon its significance dwindled to a minimum and for the most part it remained such to this day. But what has persisted in Goa to this day is foreign rule over a people who have no desire to tolerate it and who wish finally to join their mother-country, India.

Bearing in mind all these circumstances today — in the second half of the twentieth century, in an epoch of strong movements of all the colonial peoples for independence and national freedom — it appears really unusual that a country such as Portugal is still endeavouring to retain this possession. It is even stranger to see that country risking on this account not only to incur the condemnation of the world public opinion, but also a conflict with India, a country of great international prestige (which might result for Portugal in direct and tangible consequences). Perhaps this headstrong attitude of the Portuguese Government might be explained with some logic as prompted by the wish not to permit, in principle, the loss of colonial territories, in order to avoid the creation of a precedent for other, larger Portuguese possessions. But this logic could not subsist in the face of the fact that much stronger powers, more capable of defending their positions and possessions on Indian soil, took quite a different attitude. The competent Portuguese authorities are of course aware of all this, so that one is bound to wonder how it happened that the

Portuguese failed to follow the example of Britain and France, who abandoned their positions in India. On the contrary, the Portuguese are endeavouring to strengthen even more their rule over a portion of the Indian territory by giving some constitutional forms to the colonial administration. One also notes the attitude of India in relation to the problem of Goa. It must be clear even to laymen that in would be no problem for India to clear the whole matter by a single stroke, removing from her national body by direct procedure, this absurd anachronism — the Portuguese rule in Goa. The right of India in this classical colonial example is beyond question and there is no need to give any proofs for it. It is indisputable: India is in advance and generally in the right, while Portugal is in advance and generally not in the right. Therefore, the question is only when and how India is to realize her right.

Another question is how it happened that the Portuguese did not follow the example of the British and the French, failing to leave Goa peacefully and whence they get support for their persistent attitude. Here we must enter the wider field of post-war international relations, and consider the world tension which culminated in the cold war. On the one hand, what is involved here is anachronistic and prepotent conceptions of ruling Portuguese circles about their place and significance in the world of today, and on the other, their wrong appraisal of the trend and intensity of developments on the world plane. Hence, at any rate, their courage to explain their attitude with the vocabulary from the times of Albuquerque's conquests and Jesuit missionaries, speaking about „the historical mission of colonizing and civilizing the discovered countries“, and working among „the natives“. But this is only one less important aspect of the Portuguese attitude. The other extends to a much wider field — the field of modern international relations generally. The bloc policy, the policy of tension, all that is negative in the present world — is the real source from which the Portuguese Government draws energy for maintaining a long outworn affair — their rule on a part of India. Indeed, were it not for such relations in the world as those that prevailed for nearly ten years since the end of the war, the significance of such a country as Portugal, with its general current policy, would hardly be anything more than minimal, while its persistently negative attitude as regards the Goa problem would hardly have been taken even regardless of subjective Portuguese dispositions. It is only to be wondered at that even so late in the day, when the international situation is developing in a positive direction, the Portuguese Government should sometimes meet with moral support from certain world factors. The joint communique issued, after the recent meeting between the Portuguese Foreign Minister Paolo di Cuna and the United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in which Goa is described as a Portuguese province, was not, in the general estimation, a contribution to the prestige of American policy, although Mr Dulles subsequently gave an explanation of it.

Indian Prime Minister Nehru, speaking about Goa on one occasion, said that such problems are common „pimples“ which could easily be removed from the face of India. At the same time such problems have a wider significance; and how they are solved in a world of blocs has been shown by a series of examples from modern international relations. No matter how small in its physical scope, the Portuguese possession on Indian soil gives India the right to suppose that it might be potentially used for initiatives which would not be in keeping with the interests of peace in this area. Until Goa has been joined to the mother-country, the peaceful and non-bloc policy which the Indian Government is pursuing with such signal success could not be definitely consolidated on the Indian national territory. The fact that the Indian Government has avoided the use of more convincing methods towards the headstrong

descendents of the „Portuguese Mars“, and bring them to their senses, is in line with the policy of peace and peaceful settlement of international problems, but Portugal is undoubtedly abusing this restraint and above all peaceful attitude of the Indian Government, with its persistent and prepotent attitude.

On the occasion of his visit to India, President Tito, replying to some questions of Indian journalists said: „I think it is perfectly absurd that such a great country as India should have to

submit to such a small part of her territory being separated from it. Here concretely I refer to that part on which Portugal is still keeping its rule“.

The further positive development of international relations inevitably carries a new and purer atmosphere in which such absurdities will no longer be tolerated. The great country of India, friendly to us, will surely find ways and means to ensure an early realization of her indisputable right.

D. K.

Book Reviews

TWO PUBLICATION OF WORLD SIGNIFICANCE

Academician Grga Novak: „Prehistorijski Hvar“ (Prehistoric Hvar) Zagreb 1955, published by the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Art; Dr. Miroslav Brandt: „Wyclifova hereza i socijalni pokreti u Splitu krajem XIV stoljeća“ (Wycliffe's Heresy and the Social Movements in Split by the End of XIV Century), Zagreb 1955, published by „Kultura“.

Dr. Viktor NOVAK

THE two important scientific publications which appeared in Zagreb in the last quarter of 1955 will, both by their subject and conclusions, arouse lively interest in scientific quarters also far beyond the Yugoslav frontiers. The first publication may freely be said to be the lifework of Dr Grga Novak, Academician and Professor of Ancient history of the Zagreb University, and is devoted to the prehistoric explorations conducted on the island of Hvar. The author of the second publication is a young assistant of the same University, Dr. Miroslav Brandt, and deals with a hitherto more or less completely unknown aspect of the Dalmatian Middle Ages, namely the strong influence of John Wycliffe and his ideas in the Split area far earlier than it was felt elsewhere in Europe (with the exception of England of course).

Professor Novak first won scientific distinction with his study of a whole series of problems relating to the ancient, medieval and modern history of Dalmatia. Naturally, his native island of Hvar also figured prominently in his explorations, and it was to Hvar that he devoted his studies of the remote past, far before the Greek colonisation of Dalmatia, while devoting particular attention to the contacts and relations of the prehistoric inhabitants of Dalmatia with the other Mediterranean regions and the hinterlands of the Eastern Adriatic coast. The prehistoric localities of Hvar were already the subject of a study professor Novak published in 1912 when he actually began his scientific career. Since that time until the publication of this work of truly imposing scope and perfect technical presentation, both alone and with the assistance of his co-workers, Grga Novak worked for years on the scientific exploration of certain prehistoric localities on Hvar and the islands of St. Endrija and Vis, and particularly in the Grabak Cave (Crapeva Špilja) on Hvar. Major importance should be assigned, however, to his systematic excavations carried out in 1947 and 1950 under the auspices of the Yugoslav Academy. After this publication which is a result of more than four decades of work, the Grabak Cave will attract the growing interest of both Yugoslav and foreign archeologists and prehistoric scholars. Although in the course of his exploration Academician Novak maintained regular and continuous contact with many foreign specialists, as shown by a whole list of the most distinguished experts from Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy, Israel, Germany and Sweden, it is only now that world science which is interested in the most ancient civilisations will be able to gain full insight in the role of the Adriatic, its islands and Eastern Adriatic as a mediator for the transmission of various prehistoric cultural trends and influences from the Mediterranean to the Balkans and vice versa.

The broad scope of this work, and its scientific accuracy, caution and the severity of its conclusions is also indicated by consul-

tation of and comparisons with analogous material collected in the foreign and Yugoslav museums and various university and academic institutes. Nevertheless, Academician Novak, after forty years of work, states with a modesty and reserve truly worthy of praise: „While giving my opinion on several questions in this work, I did not wish to do so in a manner which would seem final, as I am convinced that many questions which are dealt with in this publication are such that it would perhaps be too bold to venture any definite conclusions. This I will do after the publication of the remaining material on the Grabak Cave, the excavations in the Pokrivenik Cave on Hvar and the other localities explored on the same island, as well as the explorations I conducted on the islands of Vis, Korčula, Svetac, Mljet, Lastovo the Pakleni Islands and the Pelješac Peninsula“.

It should be stressed nonetheless that the problems which were still further complicated by the findings in the Grabak Cave were always in the firm grasp of the scholar who unfalteringly resolved questions which required the cooperation of anthropologists, chemists and physicists. Needless to say this assistance was wholeheartedly extended to him by the competent experts. Professor Novak also showed sufficient scientific courage when abandoning his previous conclusions in the light of new findings. It is impossible to dwell on the substance of the methods used and of the results achieved within the framework of this article. Let it be said that this imposing work will provide numerous proofs of the links between Hvar, and hence also the other Dalmatian islands, with the Aegean and the civilisations which were diffused therefrom on the one hand towards the northern part of the Adriatic to Trieste, Postojna, Ljubljana and further to the Alps, and on the other, via the Neretva, to the Dalmatian hinterlands in Bosnia.

The findings in the Grabak Cave belong to various strata and depths as shown by the descriptions and cross sections given by the author. The discovery in the lowest stratum of a broad variety of painted and plain pottery with characteristic geometrical lines which enables comparison to be made with other similar materials in Europe and the East is doubtless the richest and most interesting. The chronology, the most complex and difficult problem of prehistoric scholars, is also subject to conjecture but so convincing that it is always the opinion of the author himself which will have to be sought. In this case the chronology is set at 3500—1000 BC. The cave itself shows various phases of use and several centuries of disuse. The origin of the pottery ornaments doubtless stems from the East. The conclusions reached by Professor Novak show that these were initially imported goods, but that the subsequent home production soon surpassed the original. It is undeniable that the results of these explorations definitely

refute the former hypothesis on the Northern European origin of prehistoric pottery. The Grabak Cave was not used as a dwelling place by the prehistoric inhabitants of Hvar who belonged to a race still unknown today, but as a religious shrine.

The work of Professor Novak is the result of an immense scientific effort and will notably contribute to the study of prehistoric events on the Eastern side of the Adriatic. Tribute is due to the Yugoslav Academy for having presented this great work almost in folio edition with several hundred tables, facsimiles of relics, numerous colour plates, photographs of many sites within and outside the cave, sketches, diagrams etc., so well from the technical point view, thus confirming its great understanding for the presentation of scientific works. Yet another imposing work will be presented from Zagreb to the scientific world which will have no difficulty in gaining acquaintance with its basic postulates as it contains an extensive summary in the English language.

Although smaller in volume (8,300 pages and several facsimiles of charters) the treatise of Dr Brandt on the influence of Wycliffe's ideas in Dalmatia already in 1383 provides yet another proof of the fact that medieval Dalmatia served as a solid bridge for the transfer of the spiritual and material culture and a powerful means for the mutual exchange of material and spiritual values. In the course of his studies of the social movements in Dalmatia, particularly the Split area, in the second half of the XIV century, Dr. Brandt unearthed a series of documents which, when duly analysed, interpreted and considered in the light of the general historical events at the time of Wycliffe's activity in Britain, reveal a spate of hitherto completely unknown facts and represent a real scientific revelation, important not only for the Croat history of that time, but also for that of England. Moreover the work of Dr. Brandt casts an interesting light on another Wycliffe follower and agitator, doubtless an Englishman who was unknown hitherto even to experts on Wycliffism. This Englishman named Gualterius learned of the rising of the citizens of Split and the peasants of the Split diocese against the papal tithe which became an unbearable burden to the broad strata owing to the ruthlessness with which it was levied by force in this diocese. Wycliffe's missionary Gualterius found an extremely fertile soil in the Split of 1383 for his and Wycliffe's interpretation both of the Bible and the relations of human beings and the social classes according to the Gospels. Gualterius activities soon led to a real rebellion and the repudiation of all papal tithes. This tax was levied by authorised tax collectors for the papal treasury through the local Split clergy which was powerless to cope with the resolute resistance offered by the masses, and in spite of the punishments and even excommunications pronounced every day. Gualterius thus caused no little losses to the insatiable papal treasury

while placing the tithe collectors in an extremely difficult position as they vainly sought to justify their failure before the papal emissaries by putting the blame on the English intruder. It is no wonder then that Gualterius is referred to in a document of the Split notary dating from 1383 as the son of the devil and a notorious heretic under the influence of the Devil himself having instigated the people to refuse paying tithes to the clergy as the latter do not use them for ecclesiastical and religious purposes but for their own profit, and the dissolute life of the Papal Curia and the clergy.

Dr. Brandt succeeded in giving a broad survey of the then anti-papal doctrines as well as those which were opposed to the Roman dogma, while considering the whole problem in the general context of social relations in England and Dalmatia, hence explaining the reasons for Gualterius' spectacular successes within so short a time. In the light of the social attitude of Wycliffe towards the church as an institution which oppressed the serfs and semi-free peasant and citizen strata of England, and of his individual teachings, Gualterius' rapid success in Dalmatia was logical to Dr. Brandt in view of the specific conditions that prevailed at that time, marked by a widespread discontent among the people owing to the existing social differences and privileges, and the tendency to Peligious schism not only among the neighbouring Bogomils (Patharenes), but also, in my opinion, among the Croat Glagolic clergy, which staunchly opposed the tendency of the Curia Romana to substitute the Slav church service by Latin mass. This is also eloquently proved by protestantism and the Glagolic adherence to the latter, particularly in Istria.

The advent of Wycliffism in Dalmatia is not incidental as convincingly shown by Dr. Brandt. Although it was suppressed by all possible means, it nevertheless shows to what extent the Yugoslav areas were susceptible to all that was new and progressive, even when this meant a prolonged and difficult struggle with a far stronger and powerful enemy both in church and society.

The conclusions of Dr. Brandt will doubtless call forth a lively discussion, both at home and abroad, but let us hope that the fundamental lines charted will not be changed or erased. This is also indicated by his new works which are nearing completion and which deal with the contacts of the Wycliffists and Bogomils, this time in Srem.

The methodical and excellently classified documentation shows a critical and conscientious research worker who is advancing steadily towards a true scientific goal. Thus we are now given a far deeper insight in the acute social strife in Split and other Dalmatian cities. And this is certainly a notable and praiseworthy result.

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
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